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RECENT DECISIONS
Although one recent cases seems to be in opposition, a perusal
of the adjudications interpreting subdivision 2 seems to indicate that
the element necessary to constitute an act "wilful and malicious" is
that the act be done with a design against someone.9 The boundaries
are clearly defined. On the one hand, it is well established that
"malice" does not signify hatred or ill will.' 0 It is not even neces-
sary that the person seeking the discharge should have participated
in," or even have had knowledge of, the act, as in a case where
the liability was incurred by the agent without the consent of the
principal. 12 On the other hand, a mere showing that there has been
a conversion x3 is insufficient to prevent a claim from being dis-
charged. The party opposing the discharge has the burden1 4 of pre-
senting facts showing that the design above stated is present as where
the conversion would amount to a larceny.15 A discharge has been
allowed where the wrongful act was less innocent than that in the
instant case, where a custom of dealing explained the technical con-
version and negatived the existence of the design to injure.' 6
J. O'D.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--DISMISSAL OF 'COMPLAINT UPON ITS
FAcE-NEcESSITY OF A HEARING UPON EvIDENCE.-The plaintiff
brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of the New York Milk Con-
trol Law of April 10, 1933,' which law authorized the Milk Control
'Brown v. Garey, 241 App. Div. 370, 272 N. Y. Supp. 312 (lst Dept. 1934).
A strong dissenting opinion maintained that the conversion therein was merely
accidental, though negligent, and therefore dischargeable. For discussion of
this case, see 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. 126.
' Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 24 Sup. Ct. 505 (1904); McIntyre v.
Kavanaugh, supra note 5; lt re Dixon, 21 F. (2d) 565 (1927); In re Vena,
46 F. (2d) 81 (D. C. N. Y. 1909) ; it re Arnao, 210 Fed. 395 (D. 'C. N. Y.
1914) ; Matter of Levitan, 224 Fed. 241 (D. C. N. Y. 1915) ; In re Nordlight,
3 Fed. Supp. 486 (1934); In re Binsky, 6 Fed. Supp. 789 (1934); Ulner v.
Doran, 167 App. Div. 259, 152 N. Y. Supp. 655 (1st Dept. 1915).
10 Tinker v. Colwell, szuPra note 9; Matter of Barbery v. Cohen, 183 App.
Div. 424, 170 N. Y. Supp. 762 (1st Dept. 1919); Couaxa, BANKRUPTCY (11th
ed. 1919) 436.
x' Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 172 (--); Matter of Peck, 206 N. Y. 55,
99 N. E. 258 (1912).
'tMcIntyre v. Kavanaugh, supra note 5.
" McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, suprG note 5; In re Dixon, supra note 9; In re
Burchfield, 31 Fed. 118 (D. C. N. Y. 1929); li re Ennis & Stoppani, 171 Fed.
755 (D. C. N. Y. 1909) ; Wood v. Fisk, 215 N. Y. 233, 109 N. E. 177 (1915).
14 Kreitlein v. Ferger, 238 U. S. 21, 35 Sup. Ct. 685 (1915); Matter of
Levitan, supra note 9; it re Kneski, 290 Fed. 406 (D. C. N. Y. 1903); Man-
heim v. Loewe, 185 App. Div. 601, 173 N. Y. Supp. 260 (1st Dept. 1918) ; Miles
v. Havens, 198 App. Div. 546, 190 N. Y. Supp. 656 (1st Dept. 1921).
'McIntyre v. Kavanaugh, spra note 5; In re Arnao, supra note 9.
" It re Dixon, supra note 9.
'Laws of 1933, c. 158 (N. Y. AGRICULTURE AND MARKETS LAw §§300-
319).
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Board to fix minimum prices for sales of fluid milk in bottles by
milk dealers to stores in a city of more than one million inhabitants
and established a differential of one cent a quart in favor of dealers
not having a "well advertised trade name." The Board determined
that the phrase "well advertised trade name" referred to four dealers
of which the complainant is one.2 Plaintiff alleges that this law is
"arbitrary, oppressive, and discriminatory" and has no relation to
the public welfare or to any of the objects or purposes for which
the statute was enacted and is therefore violative of the due process
clause. On appeal from the dismissal of the complaint, held, com-
plaint sufficient to state a cause of action based on infringement of
due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Borden's Farm Products Co., Inc. v. Baldwin, Comrn'r of
Agriculture, et al., - U. S. -, 55 Sup. Ct. 187 (1934).
The courts have no jurisdiction to determine the constitution-
ality of a statute without first having presented to them the factual
basis upon which they can rest a conclusion.3 It is elementary that
the state, in the exercise of its broad powers of regulation, is given
great leeway with respect to the making of group classifications.4
In the determination of the arbitrary nature and/or unreasonable-
ness of such classifications, it may be that the statute attacked will
show clearly on its face that the classification therein made is arbi-
trary.5 But, where this arbitrary nature does not appear on the face
2Dealers deemed to have a "well-advertised trade name" are Borden's
Farm Products Co., Inc., Sheffield's Farms Co., Dairymen's League Co. and
M. H. Renken Dairy Co.
'Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Thompkins, 176 U. S. 167, 20
Sup. Ct. 336 (1900) ; United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 184
U. S. 416, 22 Sup. Ct. 428 (1902); Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v.
Lincoln, 223 U. S. 349, 32 Sup. Ct. 271 (1912) ; Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135,
41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1921); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 44 Sup.
Ct. 405 (1924); Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, 275 U. S. 164, 48 Sup. Ct. 66(1927); Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 53 Sup. Ct. 481 (1933); Equity
Rule 70Y (28 U. S. C. A. §723).
"Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 266 U. S. 157, 33 Sup. Ct. 66(1912) (the legislature of a state may direct its police regulations against
what it deems an existing evil without covering the whole field of possible
abuses) ; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 377, 35 Sup. Ct. 342 (1915) (in deter-
mining the constitutionality of a state police statute the question is whether
its restrictions have reasonable relation to a proper purpose, and reasonable
regulations limiting the hours of labor of women are within the scope of
legislative action) ; Berkines Van Lines v. Riley, 280 U. S. 80, 50 Sup. Ct. 64
(1929); Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117, 50 Sup. Ct 57 (1929); Carley &
Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U. S. 66, 50 Sup. Ct. 204 (1930).5 Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78, 31 Sup. Ct. 337
(1911). The rule therein stated is that "the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in
the adoption of the police laws, but admits the exercise of a wide scope of
discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. A classification having
some reasoniable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is
not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any
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of the statute, it is necessary to present the facts to the court so as
to enable it to pass upon the reasonableness of the groupings.6
While the presumption is that the statute enacted by the legis-
lature is valid,7 yet, a complaint, based upon the alleged unconsti-
tutionality of that statute, should not be dismissed without a hearing
of the evidence for otherwise the right of the people to guard against
an infringement of their rights would be seriously impaired.8
V. A. P.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSION OF JUDGMENT ROLL OF CIVIL ACTION
IN CRIMINAL TRIAL.-The defendant was convicted of extortion.'
At the trial the defendant claimed that the complaining witnesses
were acting in bad faith and were motivated by a desire to punish
the defendant for his part in obtaining a contract from the said com-
plaining witnesses for a labor union. To rebut and partially dis-
credit this position of the defendant, the state introduced the judg-
ment roll in a prior civil action upon labor union contracts wherein
the said contracts were held unenforceable because they had been
obtained by duress practiced by this defendant's union.2 It was not
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence
of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. One
who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing
that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary."
Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 36 Sup. Ct. 370 (1916);
Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369, 36 Sup. Ct. 379 (1916); Radice v. People of
State of N. Y., 264 U. S. 292, 44 Sup. Ct. 325 (1924); Clark v. Deckeback,
274 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 630 (1927); Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U. S.
146, 50 Sup. Ct. 310 (1930); State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson,
283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540 (1931); Smith v. Calhoon, 283 U. S. 553, 51
Sup. Ct. 582 (1931).
8 Southern Railway Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, 30 Sup. Ct. 287 (1910);
Air-way Electric Appliance Corp. v. Day, 286 U. S. 71, 45 Sup. Ct. 12 (1924);
Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U. S. 535, 54 Sup. Ct. 830 (1934).
'Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., supra note 5; Hammond v.
Schappi Bus Line, supra note 3; O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., 282 U. S. 251, 51 Sup. Ct. 130 (1931).
1 Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, Hammond v. Schappi Bus Line, Inc., both
supra note 3; Equity Rule 7032 (28 U. S. C. A. §723).
IN. Y. PENAL LAW (1909) §850.
2The material and relevant portions of the judgment roll are:
EIGHTH: That the said instrument was extorted from the defen-
dants by the plaintiff and others acting on behalf of the plaintiff, by
duress and coercion in so threatening the ruin of the defendant's busi-
ness, in consequence of which and in fear and apprehension thereof, the
defendant, Kleen Laundry Service, Inc., signed and executed the instru-
ment.
